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It's not enough that we do our best; 
sometimes we have to do what's required. 
 
Sir Winston Churchill (1874-1965) 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background of the paper 
Oil and gas remain the critical energy sources that power industry and transportation and 
drive today’s global economy. The historical development of the petroleum industry has been 
remarkable for its high dynamics, rapid technological progress and wide geographical 
expansion. The most dangerous and widespread companion of the offshore activities is marine 
oil pollution.  It has become a source of worry worldwide because of the growing energy 
needs and the increasing sea-borne transport of oil and oil products. Current national and 
international measures for accident prevention and mitigation of their consequences are often 
not effective enough.  
The improvement of the regulatory measures is complicated due to the variability and 
unpredictability of environmental effects that spilled oil produces on the marine environment. 
The choice of specific ways of managing pollution (control, prevention, regulation) depends 
on the nature of environmental impact (long-term/ short-term, regular/ accidental) caused by 
each particular activity. Regular discharges of wastes (water produced to the surface along 
with oil during drilling) are much easier to bring under control because the relationship 
between pollution sources and damage is clear and certain. Accidental discharges (blowouts 
of oil and gas when control over well pressure is lost during drilling, unintentional oil spills 
during tanker accidents: running aground, collisions with other vessels) present a more 
difficult task because they are associated with risk. The concepts of hazard and risk are very 
important in the design of the optimal responses to accidental pollution. Hazard means the 
combinations of properties and characteristics of a material, process or situation that are able 
to harm and cause a damage of ecological, economic or any other nature (Patin 1999, p. 104). 
Risk can be defined as the probability of realization of this hazard under specific conditions 
within a certain period of time (Somerville and Shirley 1992, p. 644). One of the regulator’s 
goals is to manage risk in such a way that a socially optimal level of risk is achieved. 
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1.2. Oil pollution management in Norway 
Awareness of domestic and international environmental issues has long been high in Norway. 
As far as marine oil pollution is concerned, Norway is exposed to coastal water pollution 
arising from such strategically important sectors as the petroleum industry and oil 
transportation. The petroleum industry contributes almost 40 per cent of the government’s 
revenues and 26 per cent of Norway’s GDP1. Presently, there is a declining trend in oil 
production. According to forecasts from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate presented in 
Facts 20072, oil production on the Norwegian Continental Shelf is estimated to continue to 
decline until 2011 which is primarily due to higher expected production of gas (figure 1, p. 
52). Apart from the Ekofisk oil field blow-out in1977, Norway has had very few sizable oil 
spills. There are three main sources of regular discharge of oil-contaminated water from the 
petroleum industry: produced water, displacement water and drainage water. The total 
discharge of oil to sea was 2717 tonnes in 2006 which made 0, 0024% of the total oil 
production3. Accidental discharges of oil in 2006 amounted to 103 tonnes, or 3, 8% of the 
total discharge of oil4. Further reduction in volume of produced water containing oil is 
expected by the NPD in the future (figure 2, p. 52). According to the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration, oil pollution caused by tanker oil transportation does not give any reason for 
environmental pessimism either (figures 3 and 4, p. 53). It is evident that marine oil pollution 
in Norway is under the authorities’ control. However, the risk of a serious oil spill and its 
effects on fragile ecosystems and fishing activities should not be underestimated.  
1.3. Problem definition and composition of the paper 
The focus of this paper will be mainly on regulation of risky activities that may cause oil 
pollution. This paper is an attempt to make a positive economic analysis of environmental 
civil liability for marine oil pollution in the offshore oil production and oil shipping sectors. 
Liability for bunker oil spills is not studied in the paper.  
The main problems addressed in the thesis are: 
                                                 
1 OLF Miljørapport 2006, www.olf.no/publikasjoner/miljorapporter, p.7 
2Fakta Norsk Petroleumsverksemd 2007, 
www.npd.no/Norsk/Produkter+og+tjenester/Publikasjoner/Faktaheftet/Faktaheftet+2007/coverpage.htm 
 
3 According to OLF Miljørapport 2006, p. 16, the total production of oil in 2006 was 137 million Sm3, or 
approximately, 115 million tons. 
4 OLF Miljørapport 2006 
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Does Norwegian oil spill-related legislation have an implicit economic logic? To what extent 
does economic theory help explain and improve the existing legal rules? 
There are four parts in the paper. Part 2 presents a theoretical framework for the analysis of 
environmental liability. In section 2.1 we make use of a standard model of law and economics 
developed by S. Shavell and introduce two main liability rules. In section 2.2 we study the 
efficiency of the prevention and the activity level under these legal rules. Section 2.3 
discusses whether environmental liability should be supplemented by other policy measures, 
in particular, direct regulation. A critical analysis of the literature on this issue is provided. 
Part 3 is analytical. In section 3.1 we mention the most important conventions that influenced 
Norwegian environmental law. Section 3.2 explores whether the legal regimes in the 
Norwegian petroleum industry and oil shipping sectors ensure efficiency from the economic 
point of view. This discussion is continued in section 3.3, but with regard to such fundamental 
principles of environmental law as polluter pays principle, precautionary principle and best 
available technology. Finally, in part 4 the conclusions are drawn. 
2. Theoretical Analysis of Policies Designed to Regulate Marine Oil Pollution 
Policy instruments of risk management involve the private market (insurance), decentralized 
regulation (litigation) and direct regulation of risky activities (safety standards). Depending on 
their purpose and function, policy measures can be divided in two groups: some of them are 
designed to prevent oil spills (safety regulations, monitoring the level of care) and others are 
used to reduce the damage caused by an accident (installation of backup equipment, financial 
coverage for the victims). We call the first group of measures ex-ante instruments and the 
second group ex-post instruments. According to this classification, direct regulation can be 
looked upon as an ex-ante mechanism while insurance is an ex-post one5.  
Liability law deserves a special consideration. It allows accomplishing two policy goals with 
one policy instrument which indicates its strength and weakness. From an economic 
perspective, different instruments should be used to meet different targets (Johansen 1965, pp. 
8-9). As an ex-post instrument, liability law provides compensation schemes to victims of 
pollution. The other goal of liability is to induce the polluter engaging in risky activities to 
                                                 
5 There is an ex-ante element in insurance as the risk premium a polluting firm pays to the insurer can be viewed 
as a part of the firm’s prevention effort. The amount of insurance chosen by the polluter reveals his evaluation of 
risk. Another ex-ante element of insurance is organizing funds providing compensation to victims of oil 
pollution, though oil producers are often unwilling to contribute to such funds. 
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take the socially optimal level of precautions. Thus, civil liability operates as a threat 
deterring potential accidents and resembling the ex-ante techniques.  
There are two criteria that determine the choice of policy instruments from the economic 
point of view: cost efficiency and the efficiency in achieving targets. Cost efficiency is the 
corner stone of many economic models. By the optimal penalty model of Becker (1968), the 
optimal level of crime in the society is reached provided the equilibrium condition is fulfilled 
where the marginal cost of enforcement equals the marginal benefit of crime reduction. The 
regulator must bear this result in mind when choosing an appropriate policy instrument. 
Cohen (2004) suggests a couple of refinements of Becker’s model in the context of marine oil 
pollution. Both of them are related to the optimal enforcement level. Firstly, optimal 
enforcement is not only determined by the cost of enforcement measures, but also by the 
involved parties’ degree of negligence. Though oil spills may occur randomly without the 
polluter’s intention (for example, due to force majeure) unlike traditional criminal activity, 
there is often an element of negligence in each accident. Even if an oil spill is out of a tanker-
owner’s control, the damage of the spill will be larger than it would otherwise be if the 
required backup containment equipment had been installed on a tanker. Secondly, optimal 
enforcement is based on a trade-off between preventive measures and measures to reduce 
damage of a spill once it has occurred. In some cases actions taken in order to attenuate the 
consequences of oil spills are more preferable than preventive measures from the society’s 
point of view. The trade-off between the two policy goals can be avoided when marine oil 
pollution is regulated by means of liability.  
2.1 Shavell’s model 
There are two basic types of liability: fault-based liability (negligence) and non-fault-based 
(strict) liability. Under strict liability, injurers must pay for all accident losses they cause no 
matter how careful they are6. Under the negligence rule, an injurer is held liable for the 
accident losses he causes if he was negligent, or otherwise his level of care was less than the 
socially optimal amount. The optimal amount of care, or the legal standard of care, is 
specified by the courts.  
                                                 
6 It is not true when strict liability is supplemented by contributory or comparative negligence which will be 
discussed later. 
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Let us present a simplified economic perspective on liability (Shavell 1980, Shavell 2004, pp. 
177-207) with one polluter and one victim. Traditional economic analysis of the liability rules 
is based on the following assumptions: 
1. The polluting firm is risk neutral. 
2. The polluter’s total cost of precaution C(x) and the marginal cost C’(x) are increasing 
in the level of precaution taken by the polluter, x. 
3. The expected damage cost E[D(x)] and the marginal expected damage cost E[D’(x)] 
are decreasing in x. The expected damage cost can be also written as p(x) •h where 
p(x) is the probability of an accident and h is the harm the accident causes. We 
assume 0)(,0)( 2
2
>∂
∂<∂
∂
x
xp
x
xp . The level of care taken by the victim has no impact on 
the probability of an accident. 
4. The legal standard x is set at an economically efficient level, x*. 
5. The polluter behaves as a rational cost minimizer. 
Suppose that social welfare W is given by W(x) = –(C(x) +p(x) h). The socially optimal level 
of precaution x* is the solution to the following problem: 
x* ∈  arg max ( -C(x)-p(x) •h)      (1) 
Under the negligence rule, if the injurer takes the optimal level of precaution, x*, he is not 
negligent and must pay only the cost of precaution C(x*). The injurer takes no more than due 
care because it involves additional costs. He will not take less care than x* as he will pay the 
sum of the precautionary cost and an expected damage liability.  
Under the strict liability rule, the injurer’s profit maximization problem is the social problem 
(1). He will always choose the efficient level of care as he will be liable for the damage 
regardless of how much care he takes. The injurer’s choice of care is illustrated by figure 5, p. 
54, where the total cost of care under negligence and strict liability is represented by the red 
and blue curves respectively.  
2.2. Criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the strict liability and negligence rules 
From the cost efficiency point of view, both rules result in the same, socially optimal 
behaviour- they both achieve the socially desirable level of precaution. One can meanwhile 
compare both forms of liability using some other important criteria. 
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2.2.1. There is no discontinuity in the total cost function under strict liability because the 
injurer’s cost fully coincides with the total social cost. This is a crucial point when we deal 
with limited liability which deserves a thorough consideration and will be discussed later.  
Besides, the total cost under negligence is lower than under strict liability (from figure 5  
TCNR < TCSL), which makes the former standard preferable from the polluter’s perspective. 
2.2.2. To apply strict liability a court needs only to know the magnitude of the loss 
occurred. For negligence to work, a court must in addition ferret out the actual level of 
precaution and compute the legal standard x*. Establishing x* is an expensive process because 
a court needs to know the cost and effectiveness of taking different levels of care in reducing 
the probability of accidents. Hence, the negligence rule provides a lower level of net social 
welfare because it requires additional resources to determine the standard of care, the cause of 
an accident etc. 
Additional informational resources are necessary under negligence when the regulator intends 
a liability regime to control not only the level of care but other variables such as a firm’s 
output, a firm’s scale of research in safety technology etc. This is one more argument in 
favour of strict liability. In some cases it is equally important for the authorities to control a 
firm’s investment in precaution and its activity level because an increase in production will 
typically raise risk of accident and expected accident losses. An example is regulation of 
activities generating pollution where pollution can be viewed as a by-product.  
Under negligence, the courts get into difficulties while formulating the negligence standard in 
terms of other variables, like firms’ output. The efficiency of expanding the due care standard 
is addressed in Shavell (1980) and Polinsky (1980). Shavell points out that any variables 
omitted from the standard would be inappropriately chosen. The classical example is a firm’s 
production scale.  
The model developed by Shavell (1980) is built on the following assumptions: 
- both polluters and victims are risk neutral, 
- the legal system operates with zero administrative cost, 
- the social optimum is defined by the welfare criterion with no concern for 
distributional effects. 
The actors (polluters and victims)’ behaviour depends on the nature of the accident and on the 
type of activity. By unilateral accidents Shavell (ibid) means the situations in which only the 
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polluter’s behaviour affects the probability of accident. In bilateral cases both potential 
victims and injurers may influence the risk of accident. Injurers engage either in a non-market 
activity or are sellers of a product in a competitive market so that the zero profit condition 
holds. We find it appropriate to briefly discuss the efficiency of the liability rules in a non-
market setting. The main results in Shavell (ibid) are summarized in Table 1, p. 8.  
In a non-market setting when a polluter exerts unilateral influence on the accident risk 
negligence is inefficient. Given that a polluting firm has taken due care, it will not be held 
liable for pollution damage. In deciding how much to produce (and to pollute) a potential 
injurer will be solely guided by his personal benefits and will tend to choose a too high 
activity level. Under strict liability an injurer pays for damage whenever an accident occurs. 
The rule makes polluters consider both the effect of their output level and care level on the 
probability of accidents. Both variables will be set at the socially optimal level.  
In bilateral cases no rule induces efficient behaviour. Under the negligence rule, an injurer 
behaves in the same way as in a unilateral case taking the optimal level of precaution and 
producing too much. By contrast, victims’ choices of care and output level are efficient. 
Under strict liability with contributory negligence7 the outcome is also inefficient8. While the 
injurer is motivated to produce optimally and take optimal precaution, the victim behaves 
inefficiently. The rule incentivizes the victim to take due care while the control of the victim’s 
output level is beyond the rule. In a non-market case the choice between strict liability and 
negligence is a choice between the lesser of two evils. It depends mainly on whose activity it 
is more important to bring under control. If the injurer’s activity puts the society to higher 
risk, which is often the case, it is strict liability with contributory negligence that is preferable. 
Polinsky (1980) develops Shavell’s idea by proving that in case of environmental pollution it 
is also important to control the number of polluting firms in an industry in the long run9. The 
efficient due care standard is the one which incorporates each firm’s level of care, level of 
activity and the size of the industry. Hence it is not a standard for a single firm but a standard 
for the whole industry.  Polinsky’s model is built on the same assumptions as the classical  
                                                 
7 Under contributory negligence the victim’s claim on damages is wholly reduced, under comparative negligence 
the claim is reduced only partially (Haddock and Curran 1985, pp. 50-51). 
8 Strict liability with a defence of contributory negligence is preferred to strict liability without the defence. 
Since a victim influences accident risk in bilateral cases he should be given incentives to exercise due care as 
well. Under strict liability without the defence neither victims’ activity nor their care level are efficient. 
9 These two papers differ from the insight in Brown (1973) and Diamond (1974) who treat the level of activity as 
fixed. 
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Table.1  
Efficiency of liability rules in dealing with unilateral and bilateral accidents (Shavell 1980) 
 
 Unilateral 
accidents 
Bilateral accidents 
I. Non- market 
case 
 
Strict 
liability of 
injurer 
No optimal rule 
II.   Market case 
 
 
A. No contractual 
arrangements between injurers 
and victims (sellers vs. strangers) 
 
Strict 
liability 
of injurer 
No optimal rule 
 
B. Contracts between 
injurers and victims (sellers vs. 
customers/ employees) 
 
 
1. Customers have 
perfect information 
about each seller’s 
risk 
 
 
 
 
2. Customers know 
only the average risk 
 
 
 
3. Average risk is 
unknown 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Negligence 
rule 
- Strict 
liability 
- No rule 
 
 
 
- Strict 
liability 
- Negligence 
rule 
 
Strict 
liability 
 
 
 
Non-durable goods 
 
 
- Negligence rule 
- Injurer’s strict 
liability with  
contributory 
negligence on 
customers 
- No rule 
 
- Negligence rule 
- Strict liability with  
contributory 
negligence 
 
Strict liability with  
contributory 
negligence 
 
 
 
Durable goods 
 
 
- Negligence rule 
- No rule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negligence rule 
 
 
 
 
No optimal rule 
model10 with a qualification that an industry is composed of several competitively behaving 
firms11 .  
It is demonstrated that the socially optimal number of firms and optimal prevention and 
production become feasible only under strict liability. The outcome is the same in the market 
and non-market cases. There are n identical firms in an industry. Each firm’s cost of 
                                                 
10 The assumptions in section 2.1. 
11 In Shavell (1980) an industry is viewed as one competitively behaving firm whose harm depends on care and 
activity levels. 
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producing y units of output is C(y) with C’(y)>0 and C’’(y)>0. A firm’s cost of taking x units 
of care C(x) is x. The environmental damage caused by a firm is D(x). P(S) is the industry’s 
inverse demand with the aggregate output S=ny.  
The social optimum in the long run is defined by the efficient levels of x, y and n which 
maximize social welfare W12: 
Max W=  w.r.t. x, y and n nxxnDynCdSSP
ny
−−−∫ )()()(
0
y*, x* and n*  are obtained from the following first order conditions: 
0)(')( =−⋅=∂
∂ ynCnyPn
y
W  
P (ny) =C’(y)          (2) 
0)(' =−⋅−=∂
∂ nxDn
x
W  
-D’(x) =1          (3) 
0)()()( =−−−⋅=∂
∂ xxDyCnyPy
n
W  
P (ny) =
y
xxDyC ++ )()(          (4) 
Under strict liability each firm’s maximization problems in the short run and in the long run 
are identical: 
   { }xxDyCPyMax yx −−− )()(,
The first order conditions (2) and (3) are satisfied. Besides the zero profit conditions should 
hold in the long run: 
P (ny*) y* - C(y*) - D(x*) - x*=0.        (5) 
It is equivalent to (4) and ensures the optimal industry size n*.  
 
Under negligence, a firm’s maximization problem is: 
{ xxDyCPyMax yx −−− )()(, } where x is the due care standard. 
Supposing that the standard x  is set at the efficient level x*, (2) holds so that a firm produces 
y*. The firm’s zero profit condition is altered: given x = x*, the firm is not liable for damage: 
 P (ny) y - C(y) - x*=0        (6) 
                                                 
12 In the short run n is fixed, and the due care standard prescribes only x* and y*. 
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The equilibrium values of y and n under negligence are y0 and n0. It is shown in section 1 of 
Appendix that y0<y* and n0>n*. The negligence standard leads to a too low output by each 
firm, a too low market price and the industry’s expansion in the long run.  
It seems logical to conclude the discussion of the due care standard by asking whether such 
important variables as the level of activity and an industry’s size can in principle be included 
in the due care standard given the negligence regime. It turns out to be problematic because it 
is beyond the courts’ competence to decide on each firm’s and each industry’s output. What 
the courts can determine is whether a firm is negligent with respect to its production activity. 
By contrast, one cannot hold any firm responsible for the number of firms in the industry as 
Polinsky (1980) proves. In cases when the regulator’s goal is to control not only the care 
level, but also polluters’ output the use of strict liability is advantageous because it allows 
avoiding difficulties in formulating the due standard.  
2.2.3. However, one cannot help mentioning the advantage of negligence: the courts are 
less burdened as there are only accidents in which the injurer has been negligent that are taken 
to court. Therefore, negligence is likely to impose a lower administrative cost than strict 
liability. Even assuming that the number of accidents is unchanged when negligence is 
replaced by strict liability, the latter leads to a higher number of claims and a higher 
procedural cost because the scope of liability is greater than under negligence. A larger scope 
of liability tends to increase the expected value of the victim’s claim and his chances to 
succeed in a trial (Hirshleifer and Osborne 2001) providing the victim with stronger 
incentives to sue the injurer. However, the administrative cost of negligence may be high in 
cases where unavoidable accidents constitute a small proportion of the total (Posner 1977, p. 
442). 
2.2.4. The negligence rule is more efficient than the strict liability rule in cases of: 
a) limited liability, 
b) injurer’s insolvency or a possibility of the injurer’s escape from suit  
because the former better ensures that the injurer takes the optimal level of care13.  
Limitation of liability is a controversial issue. On the one hand, financial caps are introduced 
to prevent companies from going bankrupt and they make it possible for ship-owners to shift 
the risks to insurance companies. In case of no limitation, it would be difficult for the insurers 
to assess the magnitude of the risks and set an appropriate premium. On the other hand, 
                                                 
13 One way to avoid diluting incentives to take care may be to require compulsory insurance. 
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financial limits act against the polluter-pays principle and dilute economic incentives for 
prevention. It has been pointed by many economists (Cohen 1987, Harris and Raviv 1991, 
White 1989) that limited liability makes risk neutral agents risk-loving. The injurer is willing 
to accept more risk and consequently to invest less in prevention as he will bear only a part of 
the damage cost when an accident occurs. Though higher penalties can deter potential 
polluters from excessive engaging in harmful activities, they increase the probability of 
bankruptcy which decreases incentives to take care. The negligence standard can perform 
better for this trade-off than strict liability. The injurer is punished only when his effort was 
inefficient. This reduces the expected penalty size and the probability of bankruptcy without 
creating an off-setting incentive to reduce care. 
Polluters’ insolvency or a positive probability of escape from suit (for example, when the 
victim’s cost of suing the injurer is high) 14 discourages polluters to take proper care as well. 
We provide a formal analysis of how limited liability and/or probability of escape from suit 
affect potential injurers’ incentives to take preventive measures. The analysis is based on 
Schmitz (2000), Shavell (1984b) and Summers (1983). We use the same set-up as in section 
2.1 15. 
For simplicity we assume that p(x) =1-x. Let x, h and q (probability of suit) ∈[0, 1]. We 
assume that magnitude of harm is known only to the injurer, the regulator knows only its 
cumulative distribution F (h).  
The socially optimal amount of care can be calculated by minimizing the total cost of care and 
harm done: 
   min x {C(x) + (1-x)h}       (7) 
FOC:   C’(x*(h)) =h        (8) 
In the optimum the marginal cost of precaution equals the harm caused by the injurer when 
the accident occurs, and the first-best level of care is determined by x*(h). It can be shown 
that x*(h) is increasing in h. 
SOC: C’’(x*(h)) 1)(* =
dh
hdx    
                                                 
14 Summers (1983) generalizes both cases and refers to them as the problem of disappearing defendant. This 
problem is also referred to in economic literature as the problem of judgement proof ness (Cohen 1987, Shavell 
2004, pp. 230-232) 
15 The assumptions of the classical model from section 2.1 about the polluter’s risk-neutrality, probability- based 
safety technology and the unilateral type of accidents are valid. 
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  01
))(*(''
1)(* >==
hxCdh
hdx       (9) 
When strict liability is used, the level of care taken will be lower than the first-best amount 
because of the wealth constraint (the injurer pays liability h only if h<y) and/or because q<1. 
The minimization problem will be: 
  min x {C(x) + (1-x)q•min{h,y}}      (10) 
FOC:      C’ (xSL) = q•min {h,y}       
 (11) 
The optimal level of care under strict liability is given by xSL=x*(q•min {h,y}). 
( s
 by SOC (9) 
C’ (xSL) =qh < h= C’(x*(h))    => xSL = x*(qh) < x*(h) by SOC (9) 
ce 
rule will be more efficient. If xNR ≠ x*(h), neither rule is efficient, according to the model.  
 all q< qc the injurer 
will take insufficient care, and the negligence rule becomes inefficient.  
ence rule, the injurer facing 
the total cost of TC1 will end up with the care level x1 and not x*. 
more care under the negligence rule than under the strict liability rule. For q>qc the 
Under limited liability: h>y suppo e that q=1) 
C’ (xSL) =y < h= C’(x*(h))  =>  xSL= x*(y) < x*(h)
Under probability of suit:  q<1 (suppose h ≤ y) 
Given the negligence standard is set correctly by a court such that xNR= x*(h), the negligen
Summers (1983) obtains a slightly different result. The author defines the critical level of the 
probability of suit qc and proves that as long as q> qc negligence does provide efficiency. The 
argument is demonstrated graphically in figure 5, p. 54. Since q<1, the total cost curve TC 
shifts downwards. For q>qc, the injurer still chooses x* because his total cost curve TC1 (pink 
curve) is higher than cost of care TCNR(x*) under the negligence rule for all values of x. When 
q reaches some critical level qc and the total cost equals TC2 (green curve), the precautionary 
cost of negligence standard x* would be higher than the sum of C(x) and the expected 
discounted damage cost. The new total cost TC2 is minimized at x2. For
Under strict liability, an injurer with q<1 and/or h>y will always choose a lower level of 
precaution than the optimal amount. There is no critical probability of suit or critical 
likelihood of insolvency for the injurer since his total cost function is continuous. As q goes to 
0, the injurer will take less and less care. Unlike under the neglig
Given the probability of suit 0<q<1, the injurer will take at least the same, and sometimes 
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negligence rule will be more efficient, while for q<qc both approaches will result in the 
injurer’s taking the inefficiently low level of care.  
2.2.5. In a dynamic setting both strict liability and negligence can be desirable. One can 
argue that strict liability provides companies with more incentives to invest in R&D to find a 
better technology that would reduce the probability of accidents (Posner 1977, pp. 138-139). 
The negligence standard, on the contrary, creates fewer incentives for technological 
improvements because the optimal level of care depends only on current technology. 
However, one can also show that the negligence rule does not prevent firms from being 
innovative. When firms develop a new prevention technology they can renegotiate the 
standard with the regulator. 
2.3 Comparing civil liability with other instruments of regulating oil pollution 
2.3.1 Coasean bargaining 
The prime issue of the economic literature on optimal regulation is the choice of instruments 
correcting for externalities. The analysis of economic efficiency of various allocations in the 
presence of externalities is influenced by Ronald Coase’s pioneering contribution (1960). 
Given the property rights are clearly defined, there are zero transaction costs, perfect 
information and a costless legal system for enforcing contracts, the efficient outcome will be 
reached independent of the initial allocation of the property rights. The fact that transaction 
costs are not negligible and marine environment is not subject to well-defined and clearly 
established property rights makes the Coase bargaining inapplicable. Marine oil pollution is 
difficult to control because it affects primarily unowned things (fish, the marine biodiversity 
etc). In this case the polluter will not be sued and will not bear the full consequences of his 
hazardous activity. The economic literature on accident law demonstrates that legal rules can 
remedy externalities associated with oil pollution damage. 
2.3.2. Choice between ex-post and ex-ante policies 
Before we proceed discussing the use of ex-post and ex-ante policies it should be noted that 
the liability rules discussed above are treated as ex-ante measures by some scholars and as ex-
post measures by others. In legal literature the compensatory function of the strict liability 
rule is viewed as more important due to its distributional advantage (Posner 1977, p. 18, 
Wetterstein 2004, p. 66). Lawyers are concerned with the issues of justice. They address 
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primarily such questions as who should bear the cost of accidents. Nevertheless, one cannot 
but admit that lawyers and judges are also concerned with the preventive dimension since any 
decision constitutes a precedent. Legal errors can encourage unlawful behaviour in the future.  
In economic literature there is no unanimity on how the strict liability rule should be 
classified. Some economists (Faure 1995, Faure and Hui 2005) state that the prime goal of 
liability law is to ensure deterrence in order to prevent future accidents and thus reduce 
accident costs.  Other authors (Kolstad et al. 1990, Schmitz 2000) support the legal approach 
and treat liability as an ex-post measure. One reason can be that in case of environmental 
pollution, which is studied by Kolstad et al. and Schmitz, liability fails sometimes to provide 
deterrence, for example, due to uncertainty about causation.  
Economists have generally treated the ex-ante and ex-post instruments as substitutes. One of 
the most noticeable features of current policy correcting for externalities is the combined use 
of ex-ante and ex-post techniques. The most cited example is from the USA. There are ex-
ante technological regulations (The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 1982) as well 
as ex-post codifications of liability (The Comprehensive Environmental Resource, 
Compensation, and Liability Act 1979) governing the generation and disposal of hazardous 
wastes. We will first provide the analysis of strict liability and safety standards treating them 
as substitutes and then study the efficiency of their joint use. 
2.3.2.1. Substitutionary use of liability and direct regulation 
The economic literature studying various law enforcement strategies (Shavell 1984a, Glaeser 
and Shleifer 2003, Glaeser et al. 2001) suggests the following factors that may explain the 
social desirability of each single strategy: 
- Knowledge about risky activities. If private parties are better informed about the 
benefits of their activity or the cost of reducing the probability and magnitude of risks than a 
regulatory authority, it would be sensible to let the private actors decide how to control the 
accident risk. In this case liability rules are preferred to regulation. Given the courts are able 
to acquire sufficient information to set the due care standard, negligence rule can also be 
efficient. There are also situations when the regulator possesses superior information about 
risks because to get such information requires substantial resources which private firms might 
lack.  
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- Incentives to enforce legal rules. Regulators may have strong economic incentives to 
pursue investigations, unlike judges. This argument favours direct regulation when a litigation 
process is costly and judges lack resources and incentives to engage in it. Such strong 
incentives are provided when a regulator is rewarded for finding violations or when he is 
better specialized to establish whether a violation has occurred. It appears to be that it is easier 
to incentivize regulators than judges because judges are more independent16. 
- Private parties’ wealth restrictions. In this case regulation is more advantageous than 
liability. Under regulation, parties would be induced to take preventive measures to reduce 
risks as a precondition for engaging in their activities. 
- Possibility of private parties to escape from suit. There are several reasons why 
 tortfeasors may not be held liable. If the harms generated by the polluter are widely dispersed 
and there are many identical actors equally injured by the harm, it becomes unattractive for 
any single victim to bring a suit. It resembles a free rider problem in the sense that the cost of 
initiating legal action against the polluter is huge and is borne only by the “active” victim17. 
The benefit of penalizing the polluter in case the victim wins is shared by all the other injured 
parties (for example, the court obliges the polluter to clean up or to compensate the other 
victims). Another reason is the passage of a long period of time before harm is discovered. In 
this situation acquiring necessary evidence can be problematic.   
- The administrative cost when either tort law or regulation is used. It is reasonable to 
believe that administrative cost under liability is lower than under regulation because the cost 
is incurred only if harm occurs (Shavell, 1984a). It is assumed further that even if harm 
occurs, administrative costs will still be low. First, under negligence, potential injurers are 
provided with incentives to exercise due care. Injured parties should be aware of it and should 
not sue the injurers. Second, it is likely that the cost of settlement of a suit is lower that the 
cost of a trial. However, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) argue that the identification of violations 
may be cheaper and more certain under regulation. In some cases it is less costly to check if 
required safety equipment has been installed than to prove the injurer’s negligence.  
The analysis of these five determinants demonstrates that some of them may favour liability 
(administrative cost and informational advantage) and the other three favour regulation 
(enforcement incentives, wealth constraint and probability of escape from suit). It implies that 
                                                 
16 Glaeser et al. (2001) 
17 This is not the case when the victim’s claim is covered by the compensation fund financed by oil producers. 
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the exclusive use of either regulation or liability is not optimal. Their combination can provide 
a better solution to the problem of risk reduction. 
2.3.2.2. Complementary use of liability and direct regulation 
We discuss the efficiency of the joint use of liability and direct regulation based on the 
insights from Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), Shavell (1984b), Kolstad et al. (1990) and Schmitz 
(2000). The main argument for the joint use is that neither policy used alone incentivizes 
firms to choose the efficient level of care.  
Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) suggest that the optimal choice of enforcement regimes, in 
particular, direct regulation and/or litigation, depends crucially on their vulnerability to 
subversion18. Vulnerability to subversion hinges, in its turn, on how much law and order a 
country has. A combination of regulation and litigation is efficient when the level of law and 
order is intermediate. Normally, the penalties associated with a pure liability regime are high, 
and justice is subject to subversion in this regime. Since in some cases regulation provides a 
cheaper verification of violations and, consequently, imposes lower fines (see the 
administrative cost criterion in the previous subsection), it is subverted less frequently. 
Therefore, regulation supplementing liability may become advantageous.  
The main criticism of exclusive use of direct regulation is that the regulator has imperfect 
information about damage, h19. Thus, inefficiency arises because pure ex-ante regulation 
requires the same regulatory standard for all injurers. Firms that cause small accidents are 
over-regulated and firms that cause large accidents are under-regulated.  
Let s be a regulatory standard of care, s  ∈ [0, 1]. The socially optimal standard sR can be 
found by minimizing the expected total
R
 cost: 
   min s E[C(s) + (1-s)h]      (12) 
 FOC:   C’ (sR) =E[h]        (13) R
The optimal standard sR is given by sR RR
                                                
 =x*(E[h]).  
 
18 By subversion the authors mean a number of legal (favourable legislation) and illegal (bribing judges) 
strategies aiming to avoid punishment.  
19 We use the same setup as in 2.2.5, but now we assume that there are several injurers and victims. It is also 
assumed that h can be verified once an accident has occurred. 
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For any given h the regulator will prefer the approach that gets the society closest to x*. 
Shavell (1984b) argues that a mixed regulatory system can sometimes do better than either 
approach alone. Direct regulation effectively provides a lower bound on precaution and 
should be used for low levels of harm. For larger accidents, liability will apply. The optimal 
combination of direct regulation and liability is shown in figure 6, p. 54, as xRL (h). Liability 
used alone ensures level of care xL that is below the first best amount, x*(h), for all values of 
h. Besides xL is constant in its argument for high levels of harm h≥ y
) . Under regulation, sR is 
too high for small accidents and too small for large ones. Since under the joint use of 
regulation and liability, regulation is preferred for smaller accidents, the standard s
R
RL should 
be set lower than sRR. In some cases when the standard is set too high, in figure 6 RLs
) , a 
combination of the two measures does no better than regulation alone. Use of liability is 
superfluous as the outcome is the same as if regulation alone was employed. 
Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) analyse a combination of negligence liability and safety 
standards. They base their model on the assumption of a potential injurer’s uncertainty about 
the legal standard. It is shown that this uncertainty makes the negligence standard inefficient. 
In some cases when polluters underestimate the legal standard of care and take insufficient 
precaution the complementary use of direct regulation can correct the inefficiency. Otherwise, 
imposition of ex-ante regulation, given negligence, will exacerbate the existing inefficiency, 
because firms invest too much already at the outset. However, it is not clearly explained why 
negligence standard should be used at all because safety standard can always implement 
socially optimal behaviour. 
In Schmitz (2000) the assumption of the Shavell model (1984b) about enforcement errors and 
non-verifiability of firm profits is abandoned. Schmitz (ibid, p. 372) argues that:”while it is 
certainly true that courts make mistakes, it seems to be unsatisfactory to base a theory on the 
assumption that the same kind of error persistently occurs”. Assuming that 0<q≤1 has an 
important implication for calculating the size of the optimal magnitude of liability, L*. In the 
Schmitz model the expression for the total cost under liability is slightly changed. Now 
liability L appears instead of the magnitude of harm h in expression (10), p. 12 so that 
xL=x*(q•min {L,y}). Schmitz proves that liability used alone can implement the first-best 
solution if the injurer’s wealth is sufficiently large, or L<y. The optimal liability L* is given 
by: 
    h= q•min {L,y}=q•L  when L<y 
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    L*= h
q
1   where 
q
1  is the punitive multiplier.  (14) 
Now L* can be larger than h for all q<1. This outcome contradicts the result in Shavell 
(1984b). The reason is that the Shavell model holds only when L equals h which makes the 
magnitude of liability L strictly less than the optimal amount L* for all q<120. That can 
explain why Shavell states that liability accompanied by direct regulation can perform better 
than liability alone, given the same wealth. 
Schmitz shows that if the regulator can observe firm profits and can moreover impose 
punitive measures, then either regulation or strict liability always dominates a combination of 
the two, given the same wealth constraint for all the firms. We provide a formal analysis of 
this result based on Schmitz (2000). The case where injurers are constrained is of interest 
(since with y>
q
h for all values of h∈[0,1], the first best outcome is always realized). The 
amount of precaution taken when y≤
q
h  depends on the level of harm h: 
xL=  ⎩⎨
⎧
≤
>
qyhhx
qyhqyx
),(*
),(*
The total cost under the sole use of liability is: 
TCL(y) =  (15) )
                                                
()))(*1())(*(()()))(*1())(*((
1
0
hdFhqyxqyxChdFhhxhxC
qy
qy
−++−+ ∫∫
Then we analyze the size of the regulatory standard that can complement liability: 
- s=0 is identical to pure liability regime, hence s must be greater than 0, 
- s>x*(qy) is equivalent to exclusive use of regulation, as liability never induces to take 
more care than x*(qy),  
- only s<x*(qy) makes the joint use of both schemes reasonable.  
The total cost under the joint use when s<x*(qy) is: 
)()))(*1())(*((
)()))(*1())(*(()())1()((),(
1
)('
)('
0
hdFhqyxqyxC
hdFhhxhxChdFhssCysTC
qy
qy
sC
sC
J
−++
+−++−+=
∫
∫∫
  (16) 
 
20 If a possibility of bankruptcy is eliminated and suit is always brought the exclusive use of liability is efficient, 
according to Shavell’s model (1984b). 
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It is proved in Appendix (section 2a) that TCJ(s,y)> TCL(y). 
Since TCL(y) is a decreasing function of y ( 0
)( <
dy
ydTCL ), there are values of y less than the 
threshold value so that TCyˆ L( y< ) > TCyˆ R(sR RR), for which regulation dominates liability. For 
other values of y such that <y<yˆ
q
h  the liability regime is more attractive than regulation: 
TCL(y< q
h ) <TCR(sR RR). Given that all injurers are homogeneous, all of them prefer either 
regulation or liability depending on their income y. Joint use of liability and regulation with 
0<s≤x*(qy) is not optimal. The case when 0<s≤x*(qy) and <y<yˆ
q
h  is also demonstrated in 
figure 7, p. 55, where the total cost under joint use is presented by the hatched area and the 
total cost under liability is the yellow painted area. Here q=1, the liability standard 
implements the first-best solution as long as the level of harm is below the injurer’s assets. 
It is also proved in Schmitz (ibid) that the hybrid can still promote efficiency under the 
assumption of individuals’ heterogeneity with respect to wealth limitations. Suppose there are 
two groups of individuals in the economy: with low-income ypoor and with high income yrich 
such that 0<ypoor<yrich< q
h . Depending on the proportion of low-income individuals, π∈  [0, 
1], regulation supplemented by liability is strictly preferred to exclusive regulation (π>πˆ ) or 
to exclusive liability (π<πˆ ). πˆ  is the threshold value that makes the regulator indifferent in 
the choice between regulation and liability21. The total cost under joint use of regulation and 
liability is  
πTCR(sR RR  )+(1-π)TCJ(s,yrich).
Using the logics of the previous case when all the individuals are equally poor, their 
behaviour should be controlled by direct regulation. It is shown in Appendix (section 2b) that 
when the majority of individuals in the economy have low income, the complementary use of 
the two instruments increases social welfare because the total cost under regulation (15) 
exceeds the total cost under liability supplemented by regulation: 
TCR(sR RR) > πTCR(sR RR)+(1-π)TCJ(sR,yR . 
                                                
rich)
 
21 It is obtained from expression (17) in Appendix, section 2b. 
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One implication of the Schmitz model is that, given different income levels, the optimal 
regulatory standard sR will depend on income y: R
  sR >0 if  y= ypoor. 
sR (y)=   R
sR =0 if y= yrich. 
This means that it is not optimal to use the combination of the two policy instruments to 
control the incentives of one single individual or firm. Smaller firms will stick to the 
regulatory standard, while bigger ones will be regulated by a liability regime. The regulator 
setting sR equal to zero for bigger firms can be criticized as being protective towards them. 
This implies that the regulator should explain the rationale for choosing a combination of 
these measures. Schmitz and Shavell find that regulatory standards should be more lenient 
when regulation and liability are used jointly. However, the reason for having lenient 
standards in these papers is to decrease the care exercised by some low-income individuals, 
and not to influence the expected penalty borne by them. 
3. Empirical analysis of the legal regime in Norway  
3.1. International conventions dealing with oil pollution prevention and oil spill response 
systems 
Norway has successfully supported the development of international environmental law and 
the endorsement of many significant environmental policy declarations. The challenge to 
achieve sustainable development largely depends on Norway achieving its economic and 
environmental objectives through an effective combination of economic and regulatory policy 
instruments.   
The maritime business in general has its own specific features that influence the marine 
environment legislation. Firstly, it is an international business. The sea knows no boundaries, 
and neither does pollution. Some pollution problems could not therefore be tackled effectively 
without joint action of countries at the international level. Secondly, the offshore nature of oil 
production and transportation may make it difficult to enforce legislation, for example, in 
cases when discharges of oil or other chemicals are not easily detected.  
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Like any other policies, international conventions regulating oil pollution can be also 
classified by their aim into ex-ante (prevention) and ex-post (compensation) measures. We 
will provide an overview of the international regime in so far as it is applicable in Norway.  
3.1.1. Prevention and Safety Conventions mainly focus on the technical requirements such 
as ship structure standards and safety standards which should be enforced by the contracting 
States.  
A. The MARPOL Convention 1973/197822 was adopted by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and is the main international convention covering prevention of 
pollution of the marine environment by ships. Norway ratified it on 15 June 1980 and the 
convention entered into force on 2 October 1983. The convention was incorporated in 
Norwegian legislation under MARPOL-forskriften23 and Sjødyktighetsloven, chapter 1124. 
Annex I contains the most important regulations for preventing pollution by oil from ships. 
According to the requirements in Annex I, oil-carrying ships are required to be capable of 
operating the method of retaining oily wastes on board through the "load on top" system. This 
involves the fitting of appropriate equipment, including an oil-discharge monitoring and 
control system, oily-water separating equipment and a filtering system, slop tanks, sludge 
tanks, piping and pumping arrangements. Secondly, new oil tankers are required to meet 
certain subdivision and damage stability requirements so that, in any loading conditions, they 
can survive after damage by collision or stranding.  
Revised Annex I was introduced in the Norwegian law by forskrift 15.09.1992 nr. 693 
requiring oil tankers to keep an oil record book,  in which is recorded the movement of cargo 
oil and its residues from loading to discharging on a tank-to-tank basis. Forskrift 3.06.1993 
incorporates the 1992 amendments to Annex I that made it mandatory for new oil tankers to 
have double hulls and brought in a phase-in schedule for existing tankers to fit double hulls.   
B. One more convention initiated by IMO is the International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC). It was ratified by Norway 
on 8 March 1994 and entered into force on 13 May 1995. Ships and operators of offshore 
units are required to carry oil pollution emergency plans or similar arrangements which must 
be co-ordinated with national systems for responding promptly and effectively to oil pollution 
                                                 
22International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
23 Forskrift 16. juni 1983  nr.1122 om hindring av forurensning fra skip. 
24 Sjødyktighetsloven (LOV-1903-06-09 nr 7) has been repealed , and a new law entered in force 
(Skipssikkerhetsloven , LOV 2007-02-16 nr 09) 
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incidents. Persons in charge of ships and offshore units are also required to report incidents of 
pollution to coastal authorities and the convention details the actions that are then to be taken. 
The convention calls for the establishment of oil spill combating equipment, the holding of oil 
spill combating exercises and the development of detailed plans for dealing with pollution 
incidents by the Parties. 
 
C. The OSPAR Convention25 was ratified by Norway on 8 September 1995 and 
entered into force on 25 March 1998. Annex III deals with prevention and elimination of 
pollution from offshore sources, including oil pollution. The convention includes a series of 
provisions and, among other things,             
- requires the application of: 
o the precautionary principle; 
o the polluter pays principle; 
o best available techniques (BAT) and best environmental practice (BEP), 
including clean technology; 
- provides for the Commission established by the OSPAR Convention to adopt binding 
decisions; 
- provides for the participation of observers, including non-governmental organisations, 
in the work of the Commission; 
- establishes rights of access to information about the maritime area of the Convention. 
In the Norwegian law the provisions of the OSPAR convention are reflected in forskrift 
1.06.2004 nr 931 om begrensning av forurensning (forurensningsforskriften) kapittel 19 and 
in forskrift 3.09.2001 nr 1157 om utføring av aktiviteter i petroleumsvirksomheten 
(aktivitetsforskriften), kapittel X-II. 
An example of practical application of the OSPAR provisions is a requirement of certain 
clean-up techniques. Forurensningsforskriften26 regulates the use of oil dispersants and other 
chemicals dissolving oil in case of accidental oil spills. All the chemicals should be initially 
                                                 
25 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic. The convention merged 
and modernized the Oslo Convention signed in 1972 (Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft) and the Paris Convention (Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
from Land-Based Sources) signed in 1974. 
26 Kapittel 19. Sammensetning og bruk av dispergeringsmidler og strandrensemidler for bekjempelse av 
oljeforurensning, §19-4, vedlegg 1. 
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tested and the test results are to be reported according to the Harmonised Offshore Chemical 
Notification Format27. Another example refers to a particular method of measuring 
concentration of oil dissolved in water28. 
D. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is the most 
important treaty dealing with maritime safety29. SOLAS was ratified by Norway on 17 
February 197730 and entered into force on 25 May 1980. The 1974 Convention has been 
updated and amended on numerous occasions (1978, 1988)31. SOLAS specifies minimum 
standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety. 
Flag states are responsible for ensuring that ships under their flag comply with its 
requirements, and a number of certificates are prescribed in the convention as proof that this 
has been done32. 
 
E. The 1966 Load Line Convention (ICLL) came into force on 21 July 1968. 
Along with the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), it is the primary 
document setting forth internationally agreed ship safety standards based on contemporary 
developments in ship design. The regulations take into account the potential hazards present 
in different zones and different seasons. The main purpose of the safety measures imposed by 
the ICLL is to ensure the watertight integrity of ships' hulls below the freeboard deck. All 
assigned load lines must be marked amidships on each side of the ship, together with the deck 
line.  
F.  The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watch-keeping for Seafarers (STCW) was adopted in 1978 and entered into force in 1984. 
The Convention was significantly amended in 1995. STCW was the first to establish basic 
requirements on training, certification and watch-keeping for seafarers on an international 
level. Previously these standards were established by individual governments, usually without 
reference to practices in other countries. 
      
                                                 
27 The Harmonised Offshore Chemical Notification Format is defined in OSPAR Recommendation 2000/5, the 
latter is amended by OSPAR Recommendation 2005/3. 
 
28 OSPAR ref. nr. 2005-15, a modification of ISO 9377-2, forskrift 3. september 2001 nr 1157 om utføring av 
aktiviteter i petroleumsvirksomheten,§61. 
29 It is also one of the oldest conventions. The first version was adopted at a conference held in London in 1914 
in response to the sinking of the RMS Titanic. 
30 Ot.prp.nr.31 (2005-2006) om lov om endringar i lov 24. juni 1994 nr. 39 om sjøfarten (sjøloven) 
31 The Convention in force today is sometimes referred to as SOLAS, 1974, as amended. 
32 http://www.imo.org/Conventions 
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3.1.2 Compensation Conventions are meant to provide compensation schemes for the  
victims and give the potential polluters incentives to take the preventive measures to avoid 
pollution. 
 
Two major international conventions addressing compensation for damage caused by oil spills 
from laden tankers are the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (CLC) and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of 
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil pollution Damage. The CLC addresses 
the liability of ship owners for oil pollution damage in the territorial sea or exclusive 
economic zone of a Contracting Party from the discharge of oil carried in bulk. The 
Convention establishes the principle of strict liability for ship owners and creates a system of 
compulsory liability insurance.  
The strict liability regime in the 1969 CLC represented a dramatic departure from traditional 
maritime law which based liability on fault. In order to relieve the ship-owner of the liability 
burden by the requirements of the 1969 CLC and at the same time to provide additional 
compensation to the victims of pollution damage in cases where compensation under the 1969 
CLC was either inadequate or unobtainable, a special fund was established by the 1971 Fund 
Convention33. 
In 1992 both the 1969 CLC and the 1971 Fund Convention were replaced by their 1992 
Protocols34. The 1992 Protocol also extended the Convention to cover spills from sea-going 
vessels constructed or adapted to carry oil in bulk as cargo so that it applies to both laden and 
unladen tankers, including spills of bunker oil from such ships. Under the 1992 Protocol, a 
ship-owner cannot limit liability if it is proved that pollution resulted from the ship-owner’s 
personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and 
with knowledge that such damage would probably result. Norway ratified both 1992 Protocols 
on 3 April 1995 and they came into force on 30 May 1996. The provisions of the 1992 
Protocol to the CLC were introduced into Norwegian legislation in the Maritime Code 
                                                 
33 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage 
34 The 1969 CLC regime and the regime established in the 1992 Protocol are co-existing, since there are a 
number of States which are Party to the 1969 CLC and have not yet ratified the 1992 regime - which is intended 
to eventually replace the 1969 CLC. 
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24.06.1994, chapters 10 and 12. The 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention35 was included in 
the Maritime Code 24.06.1994, §20136.  
There was a series of amendments to the 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention, among which 
the most important ones took place in 2000 and 2003. In October 2000, following the Erika 
disaster in 1999, a 50.37% increase in the limit of liability under the 1992 Protocol, was 
agreed by the IMO. Norway adopted both the 2000 Amendment37 and the 2003 Protocol 
establishing an International Oil Pollution Compensation Supplementary Fund (the Maritime 
Code, §201)38  and further expanding the amount of compensation.  
3.1.3 UNCLOS  
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas, UNCLOS, concluded in 1982, was 
ratified by Norway 24.06.199639 and entered into force 24.07.1996. UNCLOS is a global 
convention providing a jurisdictional framework that regulates the features and extent of State 
jurisdiction for the implementation of IMO conventions. UNCLOS governs all aspects of 
ocean space, among others environmental control, marine scientific research and the 
settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters. Some of the key features of the Convention 
relevant to prevention of marine pollution are the following:  
- sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone with respect to 
natural resources and certain economic activities;  
- States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are expected to cooperate in 
managing living resources, environmental and research policies and activities;  
- States are bound to prevent and control marine pollution and are liable for damage 
caused by violation of their international obligations to combat such pollution. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the discussion of the impact of relevant international conventions on 
Norwegian legislation. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Protocol to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 
36 Ot.prp.nr.21 (1994-1995) 
37 Ot.prp.nr.32 (2001-2002), in force from November 2003 
38 Ot.prp.nr.28 (2003-2004) 
 
39 St.prp.nr.37 (1995-1996) and Innst.S.nr.227 (1995-1996) 
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Table 2.  Implementation of International Conventions  Regulating Oil Pollution in 
Norway 
 Compensation and 
Liability 
Prevention and Safety Jurisdiction 
Transportation CLC 1969, Fund 1971 
Amendments 1992 to CLC 
1969 and Fund 1971 
Amendments to Fund 
2000, 2003 
MARPOL 
OSPAR 
OPRC 
SOLAS 
Load Lines 
STCW 
UNCLOS 
Production Supplementary Fund 2003 OSPAR 
OPRC 
 
 
3.2. Critical economic analysis of the current liability regimes for marine oil pollution in 
Norway  
In this section we are going to analyze existing oil spill-related legislation in Norway in light 
of the economic theory presented in Part 2. The main issue to address is whether the existing 
legal rules promote efficiency from the economic point of view. 
3.2.1. Nature of the liability rules. First of all, it is of interest to compare the liability 
regimes in the oil production and oil shipping sectors. Oil pollution liability standards for 
offshore activities, such as exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources, are defined by 
the provisions of the Petroleum Act, chapter 740. The act imposes strict liability on licensees. 
The Maritime Code (MC), chapter 1041, sets out liability for cargo ships. The Code places 
strict liability for damage caused by oil spills from a ship or installation transporting oil as 
bulk cargo on owners of ships, drilling rigs and other mobile installations. To avoid confusion 
in interpreting the laws’ scope of application it should be mentioned that there is a part of 
activities related to oil production which are however regulated by MC. If a spill of crude oil 
is caused by a ship involved in offshore facility activities under oil loading operation the 
liability of the polluter will be defined by the Petroleum Act. If the accident occurs under 
transportation of crude oil by the same ship the liability for pollution will be regulated by MC.  
                                                 
40 LOV-1996-11-29-72 
41 LOV-1994-06-24-39 
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From an economic perspective, different interpretations of certain definitions in the laws can 
create inefficiency by altering the optimal precaution level. If a drilling rig owned by an oil 
company can be classified as a floating installation, the company is still held strictly liable, 
but now it can benefit from limitation of liability set by the Maritime Code, unlike in the 
situation when a rig is treated as an installation. Meanwhile, the way a particular facility is 
classified by the laws has no effect on risk. Regardless of whether a facility is treated as a ship 
or an installation, the risk associated with its employment remains the same. Thus, the liability 
for damage and the optimal care level should not differ. 
The economic literature posits that the efficiency of each liability rule hinges on the nature of 
a particular accident. For example, people living in coastal areas have no influence on the 
probability of oil spills ex ante. An example of an “active” victim whose actions affect the 
magnitude of losses after an oil spill is coastal authorities. They can take preventive measures 
in order to reduce the coastal zones’ exposure to marine oil pollution. Nevertheless, potential 
polluters’ (tank ship’s owner or licensee) effect on the accident risk seems to be more 
important. It should be stressed that it is difficult to classify oil spill accidents as purely 
bilateral because the impact of the authorities’ actions on the probability of oil spills can be 
smaller in comparison with the polluters’ influence. Strict liability of the injurer imposed by 
the Petroleum Act, §7-3 and the Maritime Code, §191 is economically reasonable in unilateral 
and not purely bilateral cases.  
There are also provisions in both laws for the liability for purely bilateral cases when victims’ 
actions are quite significant for reduction of oil spill risk. By the Maritime Code, §192, 
Godtgjør eieren at skadelidte forsettlig eller uaktsomt har medvirket til skaden, kan ansvaret 
lempes etter alminnelige erstatningsregler. 
According to the Petroleum Act, §7-5, if the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted 
either from a personal act or from negligence of the person who suffered the damage, the 
owner may make a claim for compensation for pollution damage against this person. 
In both laws potential victims’ contribution to the accident risk is taken into account. Thus, 
under some circumstances the owner can be wholly or partially exonerated from his liability 
to the injured party if the latter has wilfully or negligently contributed to the damage. An 
economic argument in favour of strict liability with a defence of comparative or contributory 
  
____________________________________________________________________________ 28
negligence is that the authorities are more concerned with control of the polluters’ activity 
which creates a preference for strict liability, and not negligence. Since victims’ activity is 
less important its regulation is not the main target of the rule. It is sufficient to induce victims 
who influence the accident risk to take optimal care which is done by adding contributory or 
comparative negligence. Hence the choice of the strict liability with a defence of negligence is 
in unison with economic theory. 
The analysis can be applied in a market setting when parties enter in a contractual agreement, 
for instance, a cargo-owner (customer) and a ship-owner (lender of a tank ship). In this case a 
tank ship is a durable good42. Cargo owners can take precaution by choosing safer tank ships. 
Ship owners in their turn can also exercise more care by acquiring safer and more expensive 
oil carriers.  In order for a cargo-owner to efficiently decide on how frequently to lease out 
tank ships he should bear his own accident losses. That is achieved under the negligence rule 
provided the cargo owner is perfectly informed about risks (for example, the age and technical 
characteristics of leased tank ships). When risks are misperceived by the cargo owner, putting 
strict liability on the ship-owner with a defence of contributory negligence does not promote 
efficiency because the cargo owner has no motive to limit both his activity and the frequency 
of leasing out ships. While the ship owner is always held strictly liable, no liability is imposed 
on the cargo owner unless he is liable for the accident by §193, item c (ibid): 
Erstatningskrav for forurensningsskade kan ikke gjøres gjeldende mot:  c) rederen eller 
disponenten hvor disse ikke eier skipet, samt enhver befrakter, sender, avlaster,  eier eller 
mottaker av lasten, unntatt hvis vedkommende selv har voldt skaden forsettlig eller grovt 
uaktsomt og med forståelse av at slik skade sannsynligvis ville oppstå. 
Assuming that cargo owners can get complete information about a particular tank ship from 
the leasing company, we observe that provisions in MC deviate from the outcome in 
economic literature supporting negligence. A possible economic explanation for this is that 
the ship owner’s effort to prevent accidents may have a greater risk- reducing effect than the 
cargo owner’s preventive actions. Legal literature highlights the rationality of strict liability of 
the ship-owner because one can avoid uncertainty caused by other parties’ exposure to 
liability. Besides, there is no need for other parties to purchase insurance they would 
otherwise be required to have approved (Falkanger et al. 2004, p. 203). 
                                                 
42 The risk of accidents using durable goods is affected not only by the level of care which holds for non-durable 
goods, but also by frequency of use of such goods (Shavell 1980, p. 8). 
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3.2.2. Limitation of liability. The Petroleum Act and the Maritime Code have different 
provisions concerning the limits of liability. In case of damage caused by an oil spill under oil 
transportation the carrier’s liability is limited to a certain amount, by MC, §19443. However, 
the Petroleum Act warrants no limitation on liability of the licensee, with the exception of 
accidents caused by force majeure. It has been mentioned above that the conventions handling 
oil pollution liability are reactive in the sense that they are successfully amended after each 
new incident shows that the previously agreed limits were insufficient to meet greater oil 
spills. The constant changing nature of the compensation limits raises the question of whether 
there should be a limitation of liability at all.  
The standard economic literature approves of the use of strict liability only when assuming 
the polluter’s full solvency. Strict liability supplemented by financial caps is equivalent to 
strict liability under insolvency.  Limitation of liability performs better in presence of 
negligence rule which is not featured in the current legislation.  
In light of this result, the Petroleum Act provides more incentives to the actors to invest in 
preventive measures than the Maritime Code. Besides, limitation of liability in the maritime 
industry contradicts to implementation of the polluter pays principle formulated in the 
OSPAR convention by which the polluter should be fully exposed to the damage.  
 There are some possible reasons that can justify financial caps for ship owners: 
- limitation of liability of the carriers has been traditional in maritime law; 
- the risk associated with offshore oil production activities is much higher than the risk 
under oil transportation; the probability of accidents in the petroleum industry is also 
higher. The scope of activities under petroleum extraction and exploitation is wider, 
and practically all the stages of oil production involve risk of accidents. It seems more 
important to control under- deterrence in the oil production sector than in the oil 
shipping sector; 
- offshore oil facilities operate on a larger scale than oil carriers, and the probability of 
facing wealth constraint is lower in the petroleum industry; 
- supposing unlimited liability were placed on ship-owners as well, it would be easier 
for them to circumvent it. The problem can be solved by reducing the number of assets 
(establishing a single-asset company) or organizing insolvency, 
                                                 
43 The limit of liability for ships under 5000 gt is 4.510.000 SDR. For skips over 5000 gt the liability increases 
by 631 SDR pr. ton over 5000 tons. The maximum limit is capped at 89.770.000 SDR. 
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- financial caps in bilateral accidents motivate victims to reduce the accident risk being 
the second means to control victims’ behaviour (together with a defence of 
contributory negligence). 
It should be remembered that efficiency can be achieved in the presence of financial caps 
when the conditions of the Coase theorem are met. Given complete information, the parties 
can specify in an agreement how the accident risk will be shared and under what 
circumstances the liability may be limited and to what extent.  
3.2.3. Compulsory insurance. It has been mentioned above that strict liability is 
efficient when potential injurers are solvent and their liability is unlimited. Otherwise, one is 
confronted with a problem of underdeterrence and underinsurance. The injurer will be willing 
to purchase an insurance coverage up to the amount of his own assets. One way to circumvent 
underinsurance is to demand compulsory insurance covering the value of the expected losses. 
One can argue that in this case full liability is transferred to the insurer. Nevertheless, if the 
insurer is able to control the behaviour of the insured, for example, by charging higher risk 
premiums, the compulsory insurance mechanism is more effective in achieving cost 
internalization than the strict liability rule not protected by insurance. It should be noted that it 
is sometimes challenging to cope with the moral hazard problem. An example is a P&I 
insurance. P&I clubs are organized as mutuals and they provide collective self insurance to its 
members. The fact that risks are not shifted to the third party but are shared among all the 
members can reduce the insurers’ incentives to monitor the behaviour of the insured. Besides, 
P&I clubs are criticized for their market power: their share in the global marine insurance 
market is 89%44. This may lead to a lower supply of insurance against oil pollution damage 
because of high variability of volumes of oil that might be spilled.  
 
The Maritime Code, §197 stipulates that ships carrying over 2000 tons oil in bulk as cargo are 
required to maintain insurance or other financial security to cover the liability of the 
registered owner for pollution damage in an amount equal to the limits of liability set by MC, 
§194. Such high limits as specified in footnote 42 are sure to motivate insurance companies to 
control the behaviour of the insured and see to it that the insured exercises due care to avoid 
accident risk. 
                                                 
44 Faure and Hui (2005) 
  
____________________________________________________________________________ 31
An issue that arouses criticism concerns exclusion of ships transporting less than 2000 tons of 
oil. Assuming smaller tankers can be potentially insolvent, the absence of financial security 
will create insufficient incentives for owners of such tankers to take care. On the other hand, 
exclusion of such tankers allows saving administrative costs.  
3.2.4. Exclusion from liability. Both laws45 relieve the actor (ship-owner or licensee) 
of liability for compensation in case of an act of war or force majeure.  
Force majeure can be defined as follows46: “…what the underwriters called, in French a ‘cas 
de force majeure’ and in English an ‘act of God’, i.e. a natural phenomenon of an absolutely 
exceptional kind such as could not be avoided and on so large a scale that no preventive 
measure could be taken, as when a vessel was caught by an earthquake or hit by a meteorite”. 
Typically, force majeure clauses cover natural disasters, war, crimes, strikes, acts of God, 
governmental restrictions, power failures, damage or destruction of any network facilities or 
the failure of third parties, such as suppliers and subcontractors, to perform their obligations 
to the contracting party. Force majeure provisions excuse a party from liability if some 
unforeseen event beyond the control of that party prevents it from performing its obligations 
under the contract. A party is exonerated from liability only if the failure to perform could not 
be avoided by the exercise of due care by that party.  
Inclusion of force majeure clauses is highly relevant for the offshore sector activities. Both 
fixed and mobile offshore facilities operate in weather events ranging from hurricanes to 
winter cold and summer heat. Besides the damage from accidental oil spills caused by force 
majeure is more complicated to bring under control offshore than onshore.  
It is sensible from an economic point of view to exonerate the actor from liability under force 
majeure. Typically, a threat of liability induces a party to exercise care to reduce the 
probability of acute oil spills in the sea. Imposing liability for oil spill damage that occurs due 
to, say severe weather conditions, has no point because the party’s prevention effort can by no 
means influence changes in atmospheric pressure which cause storms. Hence, the care level 
taken by an actor does not eliminate the risk of force majeure events. Force majeure clauses 
protect incumbent firms from completely unnecessary investments in precaution, on the one  
hand, and motivate potential oil carriers or licensees to enter into the industry, on the other 
                                                 
45 The Petroleum Act, §7-3 and the Maritime Code, §192 
46 Official Records of the Conference on the Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1971 (1978), p. 348 
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hand. The absence of such provisions would make potential entrants responsible for 
unreasonably high compensations so that they would rather choose to engage in other 
activities.  
3.2.5. Channelling of liability. Channelling of liability to the ship owner or licensee is 
a feature of both laws47. The provision is one more object of criticism by economists. First, it 
should be remembered that channelling liability is not problematic when Coasian bargaining 
is feasible. It can be made explicit in a contract between the parties provided transaction costs 
are relatively low. For example, given a contractual agreement, a ship owner facing an 
increase in liability will be able to pass it on to a charterer in form of higher transportation 
cost. The charterer will be motivated to exercise more care by choosing safer ships and, in his 
turn, will transfer a part of the cost increase to a cargo owner. That will bring about an 
increase in oil prices that the public must in the end pay.  One barrier to implementation of the 
Coase theorem is a costly negotiation process between the parties.  
The adoption of the channelling provision in the 1969 CLC was influenced by the nuclear 
legislation in the 1960s that directed all the liability to the operator of a nuclear installation. In 
the 1992 CLC the list of persons excluded from liability was modified. The list included also 
the pilot, the charterer, operator or manager of the ship, the person performing salvage 
operations and any person taking preventive measures. There is an ongoing discussion about 
the adequacy of the channelling liability48. It is argued that one should go back to the 1969 
CLC provision exonerating from liability only the servants and agents of the ship owner.  
Economic literature admits the controversial nature of channelling liability. We will provide 
an economic analysis of the efficiency of channelling liability in the ex-ante and ex-post 
perspectives.  
1) Ex-ante perspective: Channelling can be efficient because it may induce the optimal level 
of prevention. It allows avoiding excessive investment in precaution by several parties. 
Alternatively, when liability rests on several parties which are all exposed to the same risk, all 
of them take precautions. Their uncoordinated effort results in a too high overall cost and an 
unnecessarily high level of prevention.  
                                                 
47 The Petroleum Act, §7-4 and the Maritime Code, §193 
48 Faure and Hui (2003) and (2005), Fleischer (1983, pp. 431-437), Chao (1996, pp. 172-174), Wetterstein 
(2004, pp. 113-117) 
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The main disadvantage is that channelling discourages other parties who could have 
contributed to the prevention of oil pollution. Since they are totally excluded from liability, 
their incentives to take care are diluted. For example, the Maritime Code channels the liability 
to the registered owner (owners) of a tanker who may not engage actively in operating the 
tanker. A registered owner of a ship transfers often the control over operation of the ship to 
other parties (operators, charterers) or, in oil production, the licensee can commission an 
entrepreneur to perform drilling operations. It is primarily the entrepreneurs’ preventive 
actions that reduce the probability of accidents. From an economic point of view49 one would 
prefer a situation where all those who contributed in some way to risk would be exposed to 
liability. 
Besides, channelling violates the polluter pays principle. In this case several and joint liability 
of the parties contributing to risk would dominate the liability channelled to the owner. 
2) Ex-post perspective: The role of channelling is ambiguous with regard to the optimal 
compensation regime. On the one hand, there is no economically wasteful duplication of 
exposure to compensation claims. It is beneficiary for victims of pollution as they do not have 
to investigate who precisely is liable for damages. However, victims’ benefit decreases 
because they can no longer claim damage from other liable parties50. 
Channelling is advantageous in the sense that it protects the ship owner’s and the licensee’s 
employees from liabilities that may exceed by far the employees’ wealth. Similarly, making 
independent entrepreneurs partly liable together with the owner, given the owner’s 
insolvency, could have had negative consequences for entrepreneurs’ incentives to stay in the 
industry. Extending liability in this case would make small-size companies less enthusiastic 
about entering the market. 
Channelling liability makes the compensation regime under the CLC and Fund Conventions 
inefficient from an economic perspective. If the victim cannot be fully compensated by the 
ship owner, the victim is paid by the Fund financed by cargo owners (oil companies). The 
tanker owner can be treated as an entrepreneur who is commissioned by the cargo owner to 
carry oil. According to the Maritime Code, cargo owners have no responsibility and the ship 
owner is held strictly liable. The only responsibility of cargo owners is his contribution to the 
                                                 
49 This is a basic insight from standard externality theory (Førsund and Strøm 2000, p. 44, Perman et al. 2003, p. 
134-136 ) 
50 However, victim’s losses can be covered by insurance. 
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Fund. It is identical to the situation when in oil production all the liability would be placed on 
the entrepreneur while the licensee would be totally exempt from it51.  
To conclude the analysis, channelling seems to favour oil producers which dilutes the oil 
companies’ incentives to take due care. The argument points to the need of reforming the 
current legislation.  Negligence rule does not solve the channelling problem unlike in the case 
of disappearing defendant. This can only be achieved by extending strict liability to the parties 
responsible for the accident risk. An explanation to why the channelling provision is 
characteristic of the Petroleum Act and the Maritime Code can be that the Norwegian 
authorities are more concerned with the pragmatic appeal of the exclusivity of liability than 
with its negative effects.  
3.2.6. Strict liability and direct regulation. In light of the analysis in subsection 2.3.2.1 
oil production and oil transportation fall into the category of activities subject rather to 
regulation than liability law. The reason is that liability alone would not adequately reduce 
risk of pollution and the disadvantages of regulation are not as serious as in the liability law 
context. 
As far as the cost of information is concerned, the authorities dealing with environmental risks 
have as a rule better access to relevant ecological knowledge. Small private companies, for 
example oil carriers, might lack the resources to invest in research and investigate what tanker 
design would be optimal. Private parties’ incentives are often diluted due to the free rider 
problem. Phasing out of single hull tankers and state inspections by port states are the 
examples of implementing direct regulation in the oil shipping sector.  
With regard to insolvency, oil carriers and licensees may often have limited assets while the 
potential harm to the environment caused by oil spills can be disastrous. Besides it is 
sometimes complicated to bring a suit against an oil company because either there will be 
many victims who will find it difficult to coordinate or the damage will only affect the 
unowned resources (marine ecosystem). The fact that publicly imposed instruments dominate 
tort law does not preclude the use of liability. One reason to resort to liability is that the 
effectiveness of direct regulation can be weakened by insufficient enforcement. Besides, 
direct regulation used alone is criticized for being less concerned with cost- benefit analysis 
and being more politically tinged, as in the case of phase out of single-hull tankers. In this 
                                                 
51 Fleischer (1983, p. 436) 
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connection it is appropriate to emphasize the merit of safety regulation based on formal safety 
assessments proposed by IMO and broadly used in the shipping industry. FSA involves a) 
identification of all potential risks before they lead to accidents and b) cost- benefit evaluation 
of risk management techniques.   
The analysis of the international conventions and Norwegian environmental legislation 
supports the idea developed in subsection 2.3.2.2 about the optimality of complementary use 
of strict liability and direct regulation. Examples are international conventions on prevention 
incorporated in Norwegian law. Along with liability allocation, they contain technical 
requirements (BAT, BEP) and can be treated like direct regulation methods. 
In the petroleum industry the licensee’s activity is regulated by a combination of strict 
unlimited liability and impure direct regulation. Such regulation comes from vague 
formulations of safety standards studied by Logstein (2003). The regulator sets a goal (for 
example, an emission target) and is less precise about the ways of achieving it. Logstein 
discusses the reasons underlying such regulatory methods and argues that vague formulations 
work better for incentive creation. Producers facing a goal are free to choose any technology. 
Assuming their rationality, they will choose the most cost- effective technology given the 
emission target. Therefore, vague formulations of technological standards render an incentive-
based element to direct regulation.  
3.3. Some important principles of environmental law in light of economic theory 
We present an economic analysis of the polluter pays principle, precautionary principle and 
best available technology because they have become the leitmotifs of national and 
international environmental law and policy instruments. They are used to interpret and focus 
the legal rules discussed above. 
3.3.1 The Polluter Pays Principle 
The essence of the principle is as follows: “If you make a mess, it is your duty to clean it up”. 
The first major references to the PPP appeared in 1972 and 1974 in OECD 
recommendations52. The principle can be defined as the rule that requires the polluter to take 
responsibility for the external costs arising from his pollution (De Sadeleer 2005, p. 21). 
                                                 
52 Recommendation on Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental 
Policies, Doc. No. C(72)128, OECD 1972. 
Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, Doc. No. C(74)223, OECD 1974. 
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Internalization is complete when the polluter takes responsibility for all the costs arising from 
pollution; it is incomplete when part of the cost is shifted to the community as a whole. In all 
cases, the principle involves intervention by the public authorities. 
It should be mentioned that in environmental law, the polluter pays principle can both favour 
a curative approach which is concerned with repairing damage done to the natural 
environment as a result of pollution (ex-post) and a preventive approach making polluters 
internalize the cost of chronic pollution (ex-ante). 
From an economic perspective, the polluter pays principle can be viewed as two-fold: it 
ensures efficiency (the optimal pollution level) and a fair distribution of costs when the 
offender should always pay for the harm (Førsund and Strøm 2000, p. 236). Being originally a 
purely economic rule, the polluter pays principle has gradually required legal interpretation 
which is rather obscure. The main loopholes of the PPP are: 
- Ambiguity in definition of “pollution” and “polluter”. De Sadeleer (2005, pp. 38-40) 
differentiates between two different concepts of pollution. According to the first one, 
one faces pollution only when emissions of pollutants exceed a certain threshold 
determined by the regulator. By the second concept, pollution is seen as dependent on 
its environmental impact, regardless of whether it is lawful or unlawful. It is obvious 
from the definitions of pollution in the Petroleum Act and the Maritime Code that both 
laws are based on the second concept53.  
In legal terminology a polluter is someone who directly or indirectly damages the 
environment or who creates conditions relating to such damage. The definition is too 
broad to be supportive in many situations, including sea oil transportation and offshore 
oil production.  
- Vagueness with regard to how the principle should be implemented. The conventional 
implementation of the PPP in many countries is based on the use of an environmental 
tax which is determined proportionally to the amount of emissions of the polluting 
substances. The PPP can be also introduced through a command and control approach 
                                                 
53 By the Maritime Code, §191: ”Skade ved forringelse av miljøet omfatter i tillegg til tapt fortjeneste likevel 
bare utgifter til rimelige tiltak for gjenoppretting som har vært eller vil bli foretatt”. By the Petroleum Act, §7-1 
”med forurensningsskade menes skade eller tap som skyldes forurensning som følge av utstrømming eller utslipp 
av petroleum fra en innretning, herunder brønn, og utgifter til rimelige tiltak for å avverge eller begrense slik 
skade eller slikt tap samt skade eller tap som slike tiltak medfører”. 
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when the regulator specifies how a polluter should manage a pollution-generating 
process. 
- Lack of precision concerning how much the polluter should pay. In the strict sense, the 
offender should cover the cost of prevention and control measures set by the 
regulator54. In the wide sense, the polluter has to take into account negative external 
effects of his activity that will persist in the future and will harm future generations55. 
- Exploitation of common pool resources. Access to these resources could be limited in 
some cases through assigning private property rights, however, this solution could lead 
to severe distributional conflicts. 
- The PPP’s vagueness in relation to civil liability. 
It is of interest to discuss to what extent economic considerations can contribute to seal the 
indicated loopholes. 
- With regard to the two concepts of pollution the impact-based concept seems more 
acceptable. The threshold- based concept provides no incentives to the polluters to reduce the 
amount of pollution once the standards are met. It makes the principle devoid of the 
preventive dimension. Besides, the threshold-based concept ignores the distributional aspect 
placing the burden of clean-up on the society in cases when emissions are lawful. However, 
the impact-based concept can also be inefficient. By economic reasoning, the polluter does 
not always need to clean up. Depending on the type of emissions and the emission load to 
which the relevant environmental media are exposed, some amount of pollution can be 
absorbed by the environment due to its assimilative capacity56. By the definitions in Førsund 
and Strøm (2000, p. 32) and in Pearce and Turner (1990, p. 62), emissions that do not reduce 
the quality of the natural environment are not considered pollutants in the economic sense. 
Moreover, economists argue that if “economic” pollution exists, it should not necessarily be 
eliminated. Some pollution can be beneficial. For example, zero pollution is inefficient in 
cases when production in non-polluting ways entails large additional expenses.  
Identifying the polluter can be complicated because there may be several parties that 
contribute to pollution. The efficiency argument requires that the person to charge is the one 
                                                 
54 This corresponds to the Standard interpretation of the PPP in Recommendation on Guiding Principles 
Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies. Doc. No. C (72)128, OECD 1972 
55 This meaning of the PPP can be compared to the Extended interpretation of the PPP in Recommendation on 
the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, Doc. No. C (74)223, OECD 1974, but the Extended PPP does 
not make such additional compensations to victims obligatory. 
56 It is not typical of long-lived pollutants that accumulate over time. 
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who is best placed to pay. De Sadeleer (2002, p. 45) stresses that “it is far more efficient to go 
as far upstream as possible, by identifying the economic agent without whose action the 
nuisance could not have occurred”. Following the reasoning in case of oil spills under oil 
shipping, it should be the producer of a tanker (and not the owner of the tanker on whom the 
Maritime Code places strict liability) whose contribution to reduction of accident risk is the 
most effective.  
The problem of multiple economic agents who contribute to pollution is easier to solve, given 
civil liability. It was shown in subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 that in some cases contributory 
negligence and financial caps make other liable parties bear the cost. However, the weakness 
of the polluter pays principle is more tangible under strict liability and taxation. For reasons of 
economic efficiency and administrative simplicity, it is preferable that only one liable party is 
charged a tax or held liable, but the principle does not indicate clearly how the regulator 
should determine the responsible party.   
- From an economic point of view, the choice of instrument to carry out the PPP should 
be determined by the nature of an accident resulting in pollution. In unilateral cases the 
polluter can internalize the cost of damage in form of a Pigouvian tax given the tax is set at 
the optimal level. It can be equally economically efficient to subsidize the polluter for 
reduction in his activity and emission level. The polluter pays principle can be interpreted as 
restrictive. An exclusive use of the principle testifies to the regulator’s rigidity in his approach 
to environmental management. Subsidies are generally more attractive to firms than monetary 
transfers to the state in form of taxes.  
In bilateral cases the Coasean bargaining can result in efficient outcomes if it is supported by 
the liability rules specifying the parties’ property rights. There may be cases when the pollutee 
pays principle is more effective than the polluter pays principle. Given the polluter has the 
property right and the victim can avoid accidents at a lower cost than the polluter, it is the 
victim who should compensate the polluter57. As in the case of Pigouvian taxes, to achieve 
efficiency it is not necessary that the polluter should pay. It seems that the legal instruments 
are more likely to provide efficiency than the PPP in solving many environmental problems 
because they are more flexible which facilitates their practical application. Nonetheless, 
effectiveness of liability rules is limited. For example, under asymmetric information the 
                                                 
57 We assume that transaction cost is negligible 
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victim can exaggerate the magnitude of harm and claim higher compensation. In such cases 
both the PPP and the legal instruments are dominated by direct regulation (Huber and Wirl 
1998, Wirl and Huber 1999).  
- The amount of compensation the polluter should pay raises the question of evaluating 
the losses. Sometimes they are even unquantifiable, and their evaluation is impossible. Even if 
quantifiable, it is hard to calculate the monetary value of environmental damage. These 
considerations limit the polluter pays principle’s compensatory aspect rendering its preventive 
function more significant. 
- While analysing the PPP one may wonder if the principle has an influence on the 
evolution of civil liability. One is tempted to deduce from the PPP that liability for damage 
exists even in the absence of fault. There is still more to it than meets the eye. Given the PPP 
is carried out, the strict liability regime is rather complementary than substitutionary to the 
PPP. In some cases, for example, under force majeure or when an oil spill is caused by a ship 
collision, the PPP and the strict liability regime provide different solutions. The reason is that 
the PPP, unlike civil liability, is neutral with regard to the forseeability of events and the role 
of the involved parties’ intentions in each particular accident. Conversely, it is the legislators’ 
task to decide whether full or partial liability should be imposed on the polluter. Hence, the 
PPP can be treated as a political principle and it does not replace the strict liability regime. 
From a legal perspective, the polluter pays principle remains vague despite the simplicity of 
its message. Economic arguments suggest that it is not always rational to resort to the PPP, 
like in regulating marine oil pollution where most accidents that lead to oil spills are bilateral. 
Though the PPP is not supportive to the legal system in case of identifying the liable party or 
in dealing with insolvent polluters, it can provide improvements to civil liability. This 
presents one more proof of the effectiveness of the combined use of different regulatory 
schemes. 
3.3.2 Precautionary Principle (PP) 
The precautionary principle is the most notable anticipatory principle existing in national and 
international laws. In a nutshell, it states that prevention is better than cure. The principle 
comes into its own where the parties are risk averse, or where decisions have to be taken in 
the face of uncertainty over potentially serious environmental impacts or irreversible threats 
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of harm. Perman et al. (2003, p. 250) underline that the principle serves several objectives: “it 
tries to bring together efficiency, sustainability, ethical and ecological principles, into a 
bundle that can inform target setting”.  
The comparison of the precautionary principle with the above mentioned polluter-pays 
principle and the principle of prevention reveals the PP’s essence. Unlike the PPP, the PP and 
the principle of prevention are not derived from economic theory. Consequently, the 
economic issues in the PP are not the main focus of attention. The difference between the PP 
and the prevention principle is in the risks they are intended to reduce58. The principle of 
prevention applies to “certain” risks for which it is possible to establish the causal link 
between the initial event and its adverse effects. Only the length of time before the risk occurs 
will be unpredictable. A typical example is global warming. By contrast, precaution is tied to 
the notion of scientific uncertainty. For “uncertain” risks, the cause-and-effect relationship is 
not clearly defined, but there is a “reasonable scientific plausibility” (note 263, de Sadeleer 
2005) that the relationship exists.  
In international and national legislation the precautionary principle is subject to various 
interpretations. We attempt to analyze whether economic reasoning can make the meaning of 
the PP clearer.  
First of all, the principle lacks clarity with regard to its application. Taking into consideration 
a wide range of problems it can be applied to (marine pollution, genetically modified foods, 
cell phones etc) it becomes clear that a choice of regulatory schemes depends on the sector, 
the nature of risk and political needs. It is also obvious that no single measure is capable of 
implementing the principle. The regulator’s decisions are governed by his economic and 
ecological interests which have to be traded off against each other.  
Approaching the principle from an economic angle reveals the problem of defining the 
optimal amount of precaution or, alternatively, the optimal amount of acceptable risk. Using 
the expected utility theory framework, the economically efficient level of pollution and 
consequently, precaution, is the one that maximizes a polluter’s expected utility. It can be 
shown that the individually optimal level of care does not correspond to the socially optimal 
care level. The outcome is also inefficient when the regulator bases his decision about the 
optimal care level on a cost-benefit analysis. The reason is the same: under uncertainty there 
                                                 
58 De Sadeleer (2005, pp. 158-161), Gollier and Treich (2003) 
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are no rules for integrating risk. For instance, it is impossible to quantify long-term damages 
to coastal and marine habitats and ecosystems as a result of oil spills. Besides, there are values 
that are difficult to gauge using classical economic valuation, for example, the existence value 
of endangered marine species.  
It is obvious that while choosing a policy the regulator should consider the problem in 
question not only from an economic perspective. Restricting our attention to marine oil 
pollution, the regulator’s actions often depend on the importance attached to environmental 
and economic interests. If the authorities are concerned with the protection of the marine 
environment more than with efficient allocation of economic resources they will avoid risk at 
any price and react immediately. From an economic point of view, it can be inefficient. For 
example, future risks may be highly exaggerated and preventive measures will cost more than 
damages. The merit of immediate preventive actions is that they often yield more flexibility 
for the future, so that acting early has an option value. Postponing preventive measures can be 
reasonable as their effectiveness is increased if the authorities expect to learn more about the 
future. On the other hand, the regulators risk irreversible damage in the future. Their inaction 
can cost them more than an immediate strategy in a context of incomplete information59.  
In case of accidental oil spills the precautionary principle is obviously violated, because oil 
spills represent a clear case of uncertain events for which adequate precautions have not been 
taken. Well-known remedial measures, such as use of double-hulled vessels for oil 
transportation and use of BAT in the petroleum industry, reduce impacts in the face of 
uncertainty. The relation between civil liability and the precautionary principle implemented 
by the OSPAR Convention seems spurious at first glance. However, the ex-ante element of 
liability regimes makes them compatible with the PP. One can argue that the precautionary 
principle is relevant only under negligence and totally irrelevant under strict liability. The 
reason is that the PP is instrumental in interpreting fault and, consequently, the optimal care 
level60. Practical application of the PP makes it necessary to enlarge the standard of care. 
Under uncertainty, a person who fails to take preventive measures to avert both certain and 
uncertain risks is to be held liable. In reality, the PP is implemented by means of strict liability 
                                                 
59 Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000) demonstrate that there can be no such conflict when information is 
imperfect and the consumer is risk averse. Though the regulator delays preventive action, the prospect of 
receiving information about the probability of accidents leads to higher current prevention effort.  
60 We assume that fault is defined only with regard to the duty of care. 
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supplemented by contributory negligence imposed by the Petroleum Act and the Maritime 
Code61.  
A vivid example of application of the precautionary principle by the Norwegian regulatory 
authorities is the zero-discharge project started in 199862. The project’s goal is that all new oil 
fields on the Norwegian shelf will be developed with the aim of zero discharges of oil and 
chemicals with environmentally hazardous properties. This ambitious goal has been 
successfully realised with regard to chemicals: the discharge of chemical additives during the 
period 1997-2006 has been reduced from 4161 to 42 tonnes which presents a reduction of 
around 99 per cent63. A further reduction in the discharge of hazardous chemicals is expected 
in the years to come. However, the greatest remaining challenge is the discharge of dispersed 
oil and naturally occurring environmentally hazardous substances in produced water.  
At first sight the idea of zero pollution appears to be absurd because, due to the laws of 
thermodynamics, zero pollution means zero economic activity. Nonetheless, it is not totally 
inconceivable. First, the marine environment has a positive assimilative capacity. Second, the 
possibility of abatement allows increasing production without having higher emissions. The 
core problem in implementing the zero pollution target remains the same as with the PP: how 
much precaution to take to maintain the balance between security and cost efficiency. Here is 
the opinion of E. Lystad and I. Nilsson of the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority64: 
“today65 there is no cleansing technology that completely will eliminate the discharges of 
hazardous substances in produced water”; “a level of physical zero discharges might not be 
the optimal solution. This might be the case <…> if the costs are too high”. 
The zero discharge goal was evidently inspired by provisions in OSPAR. The same 
convention recommends the 30 mg/l limit for dispersed oil in produced water66. In this 
context it seems logical to ask what precautionary approach is more reasonable: to reduce oil 
concentration in produced water to zero over the long term or to maintain current standards of 
produced water. The approaches to risk assessment suggest strongly that the main risk factor 
from produced water discharges is the concentration rather than the total discharge volume of 
                                                 
61 The Petroleum Act, §§7-3, 7-5 and the Maritime Code, §§191-192. 
62 The background for the project is St.meld.nr.58 (1996-97), St.meld.nr.24 (200-2001) St.meld.nr.12 (2001-
2002) and St.meld.nr.25 (2002-2003) 
63 OLF Miljørapprort 2006 and St.meld.nr.26 (2006-2007) 
64 Note 7 in: Ekins, P., Vanner, R. and Firebrace, J. (2007).  
65 The opinion was expressed in 2004. 
66 The average concentration of dispersed oil in the produced water discharged to sea was 16.9 mg/l in 2006, 
according to OLF Miljørapport 2006. 
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the hazardous chemicals in produced water67. Hence, the 30 mg/l limit for dispersed oil in 
produced water as recommended by OSPAR seems to be more sensible a precautionary 
scheme than removing all hazardous substances from produced water. One can rejoin that 
forthcoming advancements in technology are sure to create new opportunities and new 
economics so that previously unthinkable strategies become practical. It is likely that in the 
years to come, continuous technological improvements will contribute to reducing discharges 
from the petroleum activities.   
3.3.2.1 Best Available Technology (BAT) 
BAT represents a command and control measure and can be looked upon as related to the 
precautionary principle or the principle of prevention depending on the regulator’s knowledge 
of risks. The aim of BAT is to stimulate the adoption of cleaner processes by imposing 
minimal technology requirements, thereby shifting the focus on pollution control away from 
end-of-pipe solutions. The principle of BAT is based on both economic and technological 
feasibility68. This involves assessments of potential polluters’ financial viability, 
environmental capacities and technological options to carry out abatement. One can show that 
in some cases recourse to economic reasoning, in particular cost-benefit analysis, may block 
implementation of BAT: 
- When benefits of using BAT are measured in terms of reduced probability of accidents 
while costs are measured in monetary terms, the accuracy of a cost- benefit analysis is 
questioned. 
- If regulatory authorities have incomplete information about polluters’ financial 
capacity the latter can claim insufficient assets and evade the requirement to use BAT. 
We can interpret the two goals - zero discharge of oil and the 30 mg/l limit for dispersed oil in 
produced water- as two BATs, the first one aiming at maximal purification and the second 
one requiring only partial purification. Supposing that both techniques are technologically 
feasible, the zero discharge practice involves a high cost so that the scheme may be cost 
inefficient. In fact, it appears to be that technological considerations do not favour the 
complete purification either. The scientific evidence69 states that there is no harm to the 
                                                 
67 Ekins, Vanner and Firebrace (2007) 
68 Economic elements have gradually been acquiring greater significance which the adoption of BATNEEC (best 
available technology not entailing excessive cost) proves.  
69 Ekins et al. (2007) 
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marine environment from components of produced water unless their concentration exceeds 
the 30 mg/l limit set by OSPAR. Hence, the economic and environmental cost of reducing 
discharges to zero is not currently justified. However, this ambitious goal can become 
reasonable in the future when new information and new technologies emerge.  
To conclude the discussion of the precautionary principle, there are two major perils 
associated with an extreme approach to precaution. One is that excessive precaution can 
disrupt technological innovation, and it is universally accepted that innovation plays a 
significant role in economic progress. The second peril is that the environment would be 
harmed as the energy of regulators and the regulated society would be diverted from known or 
plausible risks to speculative ones. In general, economic reasoning does rationalize the use of 
the precautionary principle in some cases, but to rely only on the economic approach seems to 
be a one-sided strategy. Standard cost-benefit analysis should be refined to take account of 
scientific uncertainty, in ways that balance the precautionary principle against the benefits of 
waiting to learn before the regulator acts. Analysis of a BAT policy as an interpretation of the 
PP clearly demonstrates that both economic and technological considerations matter. The 
reliability of a purely economic approach turns to be doubtful even in case of certain risks. As 
for the PP’s vagueness, it appears to be beneficial in the sense that it makes the principle’s 
scope of application wider. Being primarily a legal principle, the PP conforms to the legal 
standards by which any principle should rather be “a flexible norm able to adapt to the 
heterogeneous situations in which it will be used” (De Sadeleer 2005, pp. 173-174).  
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4. Summary 
This paper is an attempt to apply economic analysis to a particular area of law, namely 
environmental civil liability. Our aim was to demonstrate that economic theory has a positive 
role in studying the legal regimes. The rationale for economic analysis of law can be 
explained by the fact that the true grounds of legal rules are often inexplicit due to the 
rhetorical character of legal reasoning. Use of economic analysis can be regarded as a step 
aside from a traditional conceptual framework. The economic approach has a rich explanatory 
power because it is not based on a conceptual mode of thinking. One can argue that the legal 
and economic approaches may diverge, the former attaching more importance to justice and 
the latter valuing efficiency. However, these two notions are not mutually exclusive which 
testifies to the potential for further development of the law and economics field. 
Marine oil pollution does not present a serious problem in Norway. One can affirm that the 
existing regulatory measures and legal regime are adequate in managing oil pollution. 
Nevertheless, the risk of oil spills persists. One should take into account the probabilistic 
nature of accidental situations and high variability of volumes of spilled oil that can change a 
situation dramatically. 
In the theoretical part of this paper the standard model of law and economics was presented. It 
seems that theory provides no clear cut answer to what liability regime is most efficient. One 
cannot but doubt the realism of some of the model’s assumptions, in particular, actors’ risk 
neutrality. Market for marine insurance rather favours the assumption of risk aversion.  In 
case of environmental pollution, and in particular marine oil pollution, theory states that strict 
liability is preferable to negligence because it provides the parties whose influence on risk 
reduction is more important with proper incentives to take precaution and limit the activity in 
order to eliminate the accident risk. Strict liability with a defence of contributory negligence is 
the legal regime imposed by current environmental legislation (the Maritime Code and the 
Petroleum Act). Hence, one can say that the model fits in well with reality. 
Addressing the main question of the paper one can definitely say that Norwegian 
environmental legislation bears the stamp of economic reasoning. Such provisions as strict 
liability of ship-owners and licensees defended by contributory negligence, compulsory 
insurance in absence of moral hazard and exclusion of force majeure can be economically 
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justified. Sometimes the design of legal rules is not optimal from an economic perspective, for 
example, channelling liability to ship-owners or licensees of financial caps on liability.  
Analysis of current policy instruments designed to manage the risk of oil pollution 
demonstrates the bite of theoretical models stressing the efficiency of combined use of several 
policy instruments. Pure regulation is sometimes difficult to enforce and it does not achieve 
cost efficiency. Liability alone is ineffective under polluters’ insolvency and in case when 
punitive measures cannot be imposed on the offender. Coasean bargaining is not feasible due 
to high transaction cost and the fact that the sea water is a common resource. It is shown that 
ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability system do co-exist in reality. 
The discussion of the basic environmental principles in section 3.3 shows that the legal rules 
analyzed in 3.2 are quite useful in interpreting the principles’ provisions which lack precision. 
It is demonstrated that once the polluter pays principle or the precautionary principle are 
implemented legal rules do not become superfluous. On the contrary, they make the 
principles’ provisions more concrete.  
To sum it up, economic reasoning turns out to be a powerful tool in explaining legal rules and 
environmental principles though economic theory is not always supportive of these 
instruments. However, one should admit that in case of environmental pollution one is often 
more concerned with human health and safety issues and environmental interests. These are 
the areas where economic considerations are not sufficient.  
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Figures 
Figure 1.  Oil and gas production on the Norwegian continental shelf 1970-2010 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.   Projected Production of Produced Water and Produced Water Discharges 
2006-2030 
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Figure 3. Number of Spills by Spill Source 1987-2006
Source: Kystverket
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Figure 4. Volume of Oil Spilled by Spill Source 1996-2006
Source: Kystverket 
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Appendix  
1. The due care standard in the long run (based on Shavell 1984a and Polinsky 1980) 
 
We make use of the first order condition (2) P (ny) =C’(y) and insert it in expressions (5) and 
(6). We obtain the following expression: 
C’(y) y- C(y) - K=0   where K is a constant.  
By total differentiation 
0'' =−⋅⋅ dKdyyC yy  
yCdK
dy
yy ⋅
= '' 1 , and dK
dy >0 as C’’(y)>0. 
Comparing the zero profit conditions under the strict liability and negligence rules it is 
obvious that KSL>KNR implying y*>y0. 
Inserting the optimal values of y and n in expression (2) gives: 
- under strict liability P (n*y*) =C’(y*), 
- under negligence P (n0 y0) =C’ (y0). 
C’’(y)>0 and y*>y0 imply that C’(y*)> C’ (y0) and consequently P (n*y*)> P (n0 y0). 
From n*y* < n0 y0 and y*>y0 it follows that n0>n*.  
 
2. Combined use of regulation and liability (based on Schmitz (2000)) 
a) firms’ homogeneity with regard to wealth 
We demonstrate that the total cost of the joint use of direct regulation and liability is not 
welfare-improving given the same wealth constraint for all injurers and given s<x*(qy). 
The total cost under the joint use is higher that the total cost under liability alone. It is 
explicitly assumed in the model that no polluter will choose a higher level of precaution than 
the first best level x*(h) because the cost of care increases in the level of care. In fact, 
polluters will rather choose to take lower care than x*. Thus, in all the outcomes except the 
first best one, the care level will be suboptimal. Using expressions (9) on p. 12 and (13) on p. 
16, sR= x*(E[h]) < x*(h) implies that E[h] <h. R
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b) firms’ heterogeneity with regard to wealth 
To get the threshold value of πˆ the total cost of using regulation only should be equal to the 
total cost of imposing liability: 
 
πˆ TCL(ypoor)+(1- πˆ )TCL(yrich)=TCR(sR RR)       (17) 
πˆ =
)()(
)()(
richLpoorL
richLRR
yTCyTC
yTCsTC
−
−  
To prove that πˆ ∈ [0, 1] we show TCR(sR RR) < TCL(ypoor): 
TCR(sR RR)=   (18) <−++−+ ∫∫ )())1()(()())1()((
1
0
hdFhssChdFhssC RR
qy
qy
RR
poor
poor
< TCL(ypoor)= ∫ ∫ −++−+poor
poor
qy
qy
poorpoor hdFhqyxqyxChdFhhxhxC
0
1
)()))(*1())(*(()()))(*1())(*((  
The proof is identical to the one in the previous section 2a). 
We prove first that C (sR) + (1-sR RR) h < C(x*(h)) + (1-x*(h)) h.  
sR= x*(E[h]) < x*(h). The total cost is decreasing for all x<x*(h). R
Using the same reasoning, C (sR) + (1-sR RR  ) h < C(x*(qypoor)) + (1-x*(qypoor)) h. 
We have to show that x*(qypoor) < sR =x*(E[h]).  In the model it is assumed that yR poor< , 
where is the threshold value. It can be proved that for income levels exceeding , in 
particular, 
yˆ
yˆ yˆ
[ ]
q
hE >  liability is preferable.  yˆ
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TCL(
[ ]
q
hE )<TCR(sR RR) 
TCL (
[ ]
q
hE ) 
= < 
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
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< [ ] [ ] )())(*1()(*(( hdFhhExhExC∫ −+       1
0
  (19) 
, ywhich holds because x*(E[h]) < x*(h). Therefore poor< yˆ < 
[ ]
q
hE .  
We show that if most people are poor, so that π>πˆ , the total cost of using both measures is 
ive use of regulation.  
πTC
lower than the cost of exclus
The total cost under combination of regulation and liability: 
RR(sRR) +(1-π)TCJ(s,yrich) 
on given the optimal standard sR:  The total cost under regulati
TCR(sR RR
By expressions (15) and (16) on p. 18: 
)= ∫ −+1 )())1()(( hdFhssC  
0
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ][ ]∫∫ −+>−+
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Alternatively, 
(20) 
 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
+−−−−+∫ )()))(*1())(*()())(*1()(*(( hdFhhxhxChdFhhExhExCrich
qy
hE
  
[ ] [ ] 0)()))(*1())(*()())(*1()(*((1 >−−−−+∫ hdFhqyxqyxChdFhhExhExC richrich+
qyrich
viduals is above the average such that y > [ ]We assume that the income of rich indi rich q
consequently x*(E[h]) < x*(qy
hE  , 
rich) < x*(h). Given that, expression (20) is strictly positive, or  
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TCR R(sR R) > πTCR R(sR R) +(1-π)TCRJR(s,yRrichR). Therefore, the combination of direct regulation and 
liability is less costly than pure regulation. 
